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Abstract 
This contribution analyses the December 2002 reform of decision making in the 
European Central Bank’s (ECB) Governing Council in terms of national economy 
size reflected in the bargaining power of the ECB Governing Council members and 
member state macroeconomic interest. The National Central Bank (NCB) governors 
of the largest member states were concerned about the impact upon ECB monetary 
policy making of equal representation being extended to future member states. By 
eliminating equal voting rights, the reform distorts the meaning of equality, 
representativeness and ad personam participation as guiding principles of ECB 
decision making, moving from equal member state representation towards an 
emphasis placed upon Euro-zone economy representation. At the same time, two 
possible concerns watered down efforts to modify ‘representativeness’ and prevent 
enlargement contributing to inefficiency in Governing Council decision making. First, 
the current smaller member state NCB governors opposed a significant reduction of 
their ‘voice’ in ECB monetary policy making. Second, legitimacy concerns ensured 
persistent support for the maintenance of a large and ‘decentralised’ Governing 
Council. 
 
Introduction 
On 19 December 2002, in preparation for the coming into force of the Treaty of Nice, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council adopted a recommendation on 
new Governing Council voting procedures following the enlargement of the Euro-
zone (formally approved on 3 February 2003).1 Prior to this agreement, there was a 
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growing literature on the manner in which enlargement should / might affect ECB 
decision making institutionally including Berger (2002), Buiter (1999), Baldwin et al. 
(2001a, b), Bjorksten (2000), Eichengreen and Ghironi (2001), Fatum (2000) and de 
Grauwe (2000). This work contributes to the literature focusing on the efficiency of 
monetary policy making and the coherence of monetary policy making for 
economically diverse states – including Deutsche Bundesbank (2001), de Grauwe 
(2000), EP (2001) and Gros and Hefeker (2000). To this can be added the literature on 
the legitimacy of the existing decision making structures of the ECB, including Buiter 
(1999), de Haan and Eijffinger (2000), de Haan et al. (2005), ECB (2002), Issing 
(1999) and Leino (2001). Heisenberg (2003) attempts to bridge discussions about 
efficiency, transparency, enlargement and democratic legitimacy. 
 This paper analyses the recent agreement on ECB Governing Council reform 
in terms of national economy size reflected in the bargaining power of the Governing 
Council members and macroeconomic preference. The reform was subject to 
consensual decision making in the Governing Council and subsequently met the 
unanimous approval of national finance ministers in the Economics and Finance 
Council (Ecofin). While acting in an ad personam (that is, independent and personal2) 
capacity, the twelve NCB governors and six Executive Board members of the 
Governing Council agreed upon a reform that reflects national macroeconomic policy 
interests and particularly the interests of the member states with the largest 
economies. The reform conforms barely to the principles of ad personam 
participation,3 equality4 (‘one governor, one vote’) and representativeness5 (all the 
Euro-zone is represented) set out in the Protocol to the TEC on the Statute of the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB) and of the ECB. The reform also 
inadequately addresses concerns about Governing Council decision making 
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inefficiency. In order to prevent enlargement from contributing significantly to 
decision making inefficiency, the principles of ‘equality’ and ‘representativeness’ 
were distorted. Yet the reform was a ‘fudge’, stopping far short of the kinds of 
changes sought by many monetary economists and central bankers. Ultimately, the 
reform might also reflect the recognition by Governing Council members of the 
ECB’s problematic legitimacy.  
 This chapter in effect presents a loose intergovernmentalist explanation – 
‘intergovernmentalism without governments’ – of the agreement on Governing 
Council reform. Not only does the reform adopted suggest that Governing Council 
members defended the macroeconomic interests of their home member states but also 
that the individual members had bargaining power that reflected the size of their home 
economies which likewise contradicts their ad personam status. Despite the official 
requirement that the ECB targets Euro-zone wide inflation there is suspicion – albeit 
not yet proven – that the ECB is also particularly preoccupied with the effect of its 
monetary policy on the largest national economies (Heinemann and Huefner 2004; 
Howarth and Loedel 2005).  
 The ECB reform process lacked transparency. The argument presented in this 
paper about Governing Council member and member state government preferences is 
thus speculative. The argument is based on an analysis of the preoccupations about 
monetary (and specifically ECB Governing Council) decision making that have been 
outlined by monetary economists and central bankers over the past decade. A small 
number of ECB officials involved either directly or indirectly with the reform have 
been interviewed and official justifications of the reform considered. The reform 
adopted is examined in relation to major reform alternatives that have been presented 
over the years as more effectively addressing particular concerns (efficiency and / or 
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representation) than others. Critiques of the reform by monetary economists and 
central bankers are also considered. Based on this analysis, the reform adopted 
appears to be a trade-off that reflects both ‘intergovernmentalism without 
governments’ and legitimacy concerns. 
  
The difficulties posed by enlargement:  
size matters but so too does representation 
The 2000 Intergovernmental Conference which preceded the Nice Summit agreed 
upon the reform of several EU institutions to cope with a considerable increase in 
member state numbers yet largely ignored the impact of enlargement upon the 
operation of the ECB. Article 10.6 was introduced in the Statute of the ESCB and of 
the ECB calling upon the ECB Governing Council to present a recommendation ‘as 
soon as possible’ following the entry into force of the Treaty of Nice on the necessary 
institutional reforms in the bank to cope with enlargement. While the new EU 
member states were expected to respect most of the convergence criteria and, 
following accession, could potentially include their currencies in the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) II, they could only participate in the Euro-zone at a later stage. At 
the time of writing (January 2007) six of the new member states are ERM II 
members:  Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovakia. On 1 January 
2007, Slovenia became the thirteenth Euro-zone member and the Governing Council 
expanded to 19 members. 
The impact of Euro-zone enlargement looms large for the ECB principally 
because it highlights existing problems with the operation of the Governing Council – 
problems that reflect the uneasy balance between equality, representativeness and 
decision making efficiency and effectiveness. The ECB Governing Council is already 
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the largest monetary policy committee of any central bank (the voting contingent of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the US Federal Reserve has only 
twelve members). There is a growing body of work on optimal monetary policy 
committee (MPC) size to best ensure decision making efficiency and effectiveness 
(see Blinder 2004; Sibert 2003 and 2006). Sibert (2006) examines the economics 
literature on monetary policy making by committee and the literature on groups in the 
other social sciences – especially social psychology – focusing on the effect of size on 
group performance and decision outcomes. She concludes that the optimal number of 
MPC members is at least five and not much beyond this. On the basis of such studies, 
personal experience and observation, many other observers argue that the ECB 
Governing Council is too large.  At 18 (now 19) members it is conducive neither to 
maximum efficiency nor to effectiveness in monetary policy making – in particular on 
technical as opposed to political aspects (notably, the specification of the ECB’s 
operational goals) (see for example, de Haan et al. 2005; Eijffinger 2006; Sibert 
2006). Future enlargements exacerbate such concerns. Amongst others, Willem 
Buiter, a former member of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, 
complains of the Governing Council’s size prior to Greek accession:   
 
A group of 17 is already too large for the serious and productive 
exchange of views, discussion and group decision making. …  A squad 
of 21 will be quite unwieldy. Thirty would be a mob. … Based on my 
own limited experience, a policy making body with seven members 
would probably be optimal (Buiter 1999, p. 200). 
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The Governing Council was empowered to change (by unanimity) its own practices if 
it found problems or potential problems in its decision making subject to the approval 
of the Council. There is much scope for its procedures to evolve — such as the 
creation of more working groups — and the work of the Governing Council can 
involve more activity at the ECB level or through the NCBs. However, the size 
problem still matters. Some monetary economists have argued that the problem could 
be resolved by more centralised policy making along the lines of the FOMC of the US 
Federal Reserve. In the ECB this would involve increasing the power of the Executive 
Board in relation to the NCB governors and rotating a smaller number of Governing 
Council places among the governors (de Haan et al. 2005; Eijffinger 2006; Favero et 
al. 2000). Others see an entirely centralised system – the creation of a Monetary 
Board detached from the member state NCBs – as the only effective way to resolve 
the efficiency problem (Baldwin et al 2001a, b).  
Such recommendations ignore the unique character of both the Eurosystem as 
a ‘federal’ banking system and the EU as a political entity. First, the centre (the ECB) 
is considerably less dominant in the Eurosystem than in the American system. The 
NCBs retain considerably more power than the US Federal Reserve District Banks 
and the governors have final say — thanks to their majority in the Governing Council 
— over the allocation of functions. Any reform to strengthen the Executive Board at 
the expense of the NCB governors would be challenged on grounds of legitimacy:  
despite their ad personam status (and not as national representatives), the strong 
presence of the NCB governors on the Governing Council was considered vital to 
selling the EMU project to sceptical national publics (de Haan et al. 2005; Howarth 
and Loedel 2005). The arrangements of the US Federal Reserve Board were 
developed just over 60 years ago, around 160 years after the creation of the United 
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States as a country and long after the conclusion of the Civil War successfully 
asserted federal government authority. There is obviously no parallel situation in the 
EU. The legitimacy concerns that the principles of equality and representativeness 
seek to address require a decentralised form of Euro-zone monetary policy making.  
Verdun and Christiansen (2000) and Dyson (2000) argue that the 
independence of the ECB and the specific objectives assigned to it in the TEC and the 
Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB places importance upon ‘output’ rather than 
‘input’ legitimacy. The ‘output’ legitimacy of the ECB and the EMU project involves 
providing low inflationary economic growth. The focus of most monetary economists 
and central bankers on improving the efficiency and effectiveness of ECB monetary 
policy directly concerns this form of EMU legitimacy. Although of secondary 
importance to overall ECB and EMU legitimacy, ‘input’ legitimacy is nonetheless of 
some relevance. The ECB’s goal setting and operational independence means that 
democratic control via elected representatives is unable to provide this ‘input’ (apart 
from the unlikely possibility of treaty reform). Without direct democratic control, the 
make-up of the membership of the Governing Council assumes greater importance in 
providing ‘input’ legitimacy. The technocratic expertise of the members provides 
some (Dyson 2000). It is argued here that the presence of national representatives 
(even in an ad personam capacity) provides further ‘input’ legitimacy. EMU has 
normally been presented by the governments of member states participating in the 
Euro-zone as the pooling and sharing of monetary policy making powers. EMU is 
rarely presented as the transfer or loss of these powers. The presence of national 
representatives in the ECB confirms the former. The absence suggests the latter. The 
limited forms of interaction between the ECB and various EU institutions – the 
European Parliament, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers (Ecofin 
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and the Eurogroup) and the Economic and Financial Committee – further reinforces 
the importance of the bank’s link to the member states. The ECB is poorly embedded 
in the contested political system of the EU which is, at present, unable to provide 
‘input’ legitimacy (Amtenbrink 1999 & 2004; Banchoff & Smith 1999; Beetham & 
Lord 1998; Wincott 2004). The importance of ‘input’ legitimacy as a consideration 
was strongly suggested by the explicit emphasis placed upon ‘decentralisation’ as a 
‘core principle’ by members of the Governing Council guiding their consideration of 
reform alternatives (Mersch 2003). A practical dimension to this emphasis on 
‘decentralisation’ should also be mentioned. The continued importance of national 
macroeconomic policy making and the weakness of EU-level economic governance 
provides an additional reason to maintain the direct link with member states and 
member state governments via NCB governors. 
Calls to restrict the total number of NCB governors in the Governing Council 
are thus problematic.6 No other EU institution7 currently denies member states 
representation (although the Treaty of Nice creates this possibility for the European 
Commission once the number of EU member states exceeds 27).8 Officially, each 
NCB governor participates in the Governing Council in a personal capacity as an 
experienced expert on central banking not as a national representative per se. In 
theory, therefore, a rotation of governors (either all or only the less populated member 
states) would be an adequate resolution of the size problem: a particular group of 
them should be as representative of informed opinion as all of them. However, it 
would be difficult for the governors to present the perspectives of other member states 
as effectively as their own and thus highly problematic to exclude certain member 
states from voting on a permanent, let alone regular, basis. Moreover, the governors 
are de facto national representatives because they each come from one of the member 
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states and are most familiar with their own national economies and banking systems. 
De Grauwe et al. (1999) also note that there is nothing in the treaties to prevent NCB 
governors from prioritising the economic interests of their own member states 
(although it is unlikely that they would do so overtly as this would undermine the 
credibility of their commitment to the ECB’s operational goals which target the entire 
Euro-zone).9 
 
Alternative reform proposals  
In addition to variants of the rotation system (discussed below), five alternative 
reform proposals were considered and rejected by Governing Council members:  a 
constituency model, a system of weighted voting, a double majority system, the 
creation of a Monetary Board and an election system (Berger et al. 2004; de Haan et 
al. 2005; ECB 2003; ECB officials, interviews 2004; Mersch 2003). A constituency 
model, based on regional groupings as in the World Bank and the IMF, was rejected. 
Officially (ECB 2003; Mersch 2003) it was argued that this would violate the 
principle of independence of the individual NCB governors in that they would 
become de jure representatives of a specific constituency rather than operate on an ad 
personam basis (in a personal capacity). The extension of the system of weighted 
voting was deemed contrary to the ‘one member, one vote’ principle established in 
Article 10.2 of the Protocol to the TEC on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB. This 
Statute allows weighted voting (excluding EB members) only on matters pertaining to 
shareholdership, i.e., NCB capital. Governing Council members also rejected the kind 
of double majority system (number, population and / or GDP to be considered) 
adopted in the Nice Treaty for the Council which, ‘concerning an intergovernmental 
body’, was not seen to be a relevant precedent for Governing Council reform (Mersch 
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2003). The NCB governors from the smaller member states were concerned that the 
need for a double majority would result in a kind of directoire dominated by the 
largest member states. One variant of this model required a majority vote including at 
least 3 of the 6 Executive Board members, with any Governing Council member 
possessing the right to verify that a pre-set GDP level was represented, thus (if based 
on current figures) giving the French and German NCB governors the possibility of 
blockage if that level was set at 62 per cent. Another rejected model was a Governing 
Council consisting of a preponderance of Executive Board members and a few 
rotating NCB governors (akin to the FOMC of the American Federal Reserve). This 
model was seen as contradicting the ‘core principles of decentralisation and 
representation’ (Mersch 2003). Finally, an ‘election system’ in which NCB governors 
would elect a limited number of their colleagues to the Governing Council was 
rejected on several grounds: an unrestricted election might infringe the 
representativeness criteria, result in the creation of a ‘market’ for votes and undermine 
cooperation among Governing Council members. 
 
Rotation system 
The rotation system for voting in the Governing Council is impressively complex for 
the uninitiated. The lack of transparency in the preparation of the proposed reform – 
itself suggestive that considerations beyond the core principles and efficiency goals 
were influential in determining the system agreed upon – has been criticised by 
several ECB watchers, notably the well-known German monetary economist Daniel 
Gros (2003). According to the reform agreement, the number of NCB governors 
exercising a voting right would be capped at 15, while all governors would continue 
to attend meetings. When the number of NCB governors in the Governing Council 
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exceeded 15, voting rights would be exercised on the basis of a rotation system, 
designed to ensure that the NCB governors with the right to vote would be from 
member states which, taken together, were representative of the Euro-zone’s economy 
as a whole. Consequently, the NCB governors would exercise a voting right with 
different frequencies depending on an indicator of the relative size of the economies 
of their member states within the Euro-zone. Based on this indicator, NCB governors 
would be allocated to different groups.  
Initially, there would be two groups. The governors from the five member 
states with the largest economies (currently, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, 
Netherlands) would form one rotating group possessing four votes (thus only four of 
these five governors would have the right to vote at any one time with a voting 
frequency of 80 per cent). The governors from the other member states (numbering 
eleven to seventeen) would form the second rotating group, sharing eleven votes. 
Once the total number of member states in the Euro-zone increased beyond 22 (up to 
27, i.e., the current EU member states and the 12 accession countries listed in the 
Protocol on enlargement annexed to the Treaty of Nice), three groups would be 
established. The first would remain the same. The second group would consist of the 
NCB governors from the countries with the next largest economies, sharing eight 
votes on a rotational basis. The size of this group would equal the total number of 
governors divided by two (then rounded up to a full number if necessary). The third 
group would consist of the governors from the countries with the smallest economies 
sharing three votes on a rotational basis. The members of the Executive Board would 
preserve their permanent voting rights.  
The division of member states into the two / three groups would reflect their 
share in the Euro-zone according to a composite indicator of ‘representativeness’ 
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consisting of principally the member states’ GDP at market prices (five-sixths weight 
in the indicator) and its total assets of the aggregated balance sheet of monetary 
financial institutions (TABS-MFI) (one-sixth weight). The data on GDP would be 
provided by the European Commission, while the rules for the calculation of the key 
for subscription of the ECB’s capital would apply (article 29.2 Statute of the ESCB). 
The data on TABS-MFI would be defined on the basis of an existing Council 
Regulation (No. 2533/98 of 23 November 1998) concerning the collection of 
statistical information by the ECB. This data would be updated every five years. The 
Governing Council proposed that a two-thirds majority of all its members would be 
required to decide on the initial adaptation of the voting rights in the two-group 
system as the number of Euro-zone member states increased. The same procedure of a 
two-thirds majority of all members would apply to the definition of the precise 
implementing provisions for the rotation of voting rights within each group (for 
example, the time interval between the rotation of voting rights).  
 
The official justification 
The agreement on the rotation system reflects the concern of many Governing 
Council members (especially Executive Board members and NCB governors from the 
larger participating member states) with regard to the potential inefficiencies of an 
excessively large Governing Council. A principal concern was that one form of 
representativeness (namely, one member, one vote) would override representation of 
the actual Euro-zone economy as simple majority voting could (see also Berger 2002; 
de Haan et al. 2005; Eijffinger 2006). Such a possibility currently exists in the system 
of representation and voting in the Governing Council. However, the possibility 
would increase considerably if all the accession NCB governors obtained voting 
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rights. The official ECB position was that a system of rotation with varying voting 
rights on the basis of reasonable economic criteria ensured the true equal treatment of 
the NCB governors and ‘sufficient’ levels of representativeness. The design of the 
rotation system was, according to the ECB, guided by the following principles (ECB 
2002b):10 
 
The ‘equality’ of NCB governors (‘one member, one vote’ principle) is maintained in 
three ways. Even though all the governors do not vote all the time, the votes all carry 
the same weight regardless of the size of national economies. No NCB governor 
retains a permanent vote. Furthermore, all governors are allowed to attend all 
Governing Council meetings. 
 
The principle of ‘ad personam participation’ (allowing all Governing Council 
members to attend all meetings in a personal and independent capacity rather than as 
representatives of a specific member state per se or constituency) is preserved. 
 
Representativeness is preserved in the sense that voting NCB governors will be 
representative of the entire Euro-zone (even though some NCB governors are not 
voting) yet there is no ‘renationalisation’ in the sense of governors being required to 
represent specific regions. 
 
Consistency is to be maintained during the transition from two to three phases by 
avoiding that governors of certain NCBs move randomly up and down between 
certain groups. 
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The rotation system was defended also in terms of not discriminating against the NCB 
governors of countries acceding to the Euro-zone in the future. Four of the new 
member states were expected to enter the second rotating group – assuming the 
continued non-participation of the UK, Sweden and Denmark – while the strong 
possibility exists that several of the other new member states would move eventually 
from the third to the second group because of their relatively strong economic growth 
(on average much higher than the Euro-zone 12).11 
 
Debates on the Number and Composition of Rotating Groups, Voting Rights, 
Composite Indicator and Representativeness 
Two or three rotating group models. The number of rotating groups was debated at 
length in the Governing Council. Numerous alternative proposals of two group 
models of different sizes were proposed (interviews, ECB 2004). These were likely 
rejected because of the concerns expressed by several of the current NCB governors 
of being placed in a rotating group with governors from member states with much 
smaller economies. The NCB governors from the largest member states also sought to 
create a small group with relatively high voting frequency. Thus the three group 
model – with NCB governors from large, medium and small member states 
respectively – was the preferred option from the start of discussions with the 
intermediary phase of a two-group model.   
 
18 versus 21 votes. The concern for decision making efficiency encouraged the 
governors from the largest member states to favour maintaining the existing 18 votes, 
while several governors from the smaller member states defended a higher number of 
voting members to ensure greater voting frequency in the second and third groups. 
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The compromise reached was 21 votes:  6 permanent votes for the Executive Board 
members and up to 15 rotating votes for the governors. 
 
Representativeness indicator. The NCB governors from several of the member states 
(notably the Netherlands) preferred to avoid the use of population criteria given that 
this would allow several of the NCB governors from Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEECs) to replace existing member state governors in the second group 
and allow Poland to replace the Netherlands in the first group. The official logic for 
excluding the population criterion (ECB 2003; Mersch 2003) is curious:  this was 
seen as inappropriate as the ECB is ‘an economic and not a political body’, even 
though the population criterion is already used in addition to GDP for determining 
member state capital contributions to the ECB and voting on these contributions. 
Most NCB governors and member states preferred just using the GDP criterion. 
However, the NCB governors from some of then Euro-zone member states (notably 
Luxembourg) also sought to include recognition of the financial sector. This was 
defended (ECB 2003; Mersch 2003) on the grounds that central banks are charged (de 
jure and/or de facto) with observing financial sector stability. The bankers also made 
explicit reference (ECB 2003) to the experience of the American Federal Reserve 
System which takes into consideration financial sector size by granting only one 
Federal Reserve District Bank president – the president of the New York Federal 
Reserve Bank – permanent voting rights in the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC).12 TABS-MFI was adopted on the grounds that it was the broadest measure 
of the financial sector, with an existing definition in EU law and an established and 
consistent statistical framework. 
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Compromising representativeness and efficiency 
The reform proposed by the ECB Governing Council has been widely criticised by 
academics, journalists, non-Euro-zone central bank officials and politicians. Gros 
(2003: 1) has been particularly outspoken in his criticism arguing that ‘the solution 
proposed by the ECB is worse than the status quo. It is inefficient, opaque, internally 
inconsistent and arbitrary’13 (see also Bofinger 2003). After several debates and 
expressions of expert opinion, the reform proposals were rejected by the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Economics and Monetary Affairs on the grounds of their 
‘complexity’ – although this rejection was not binding upon the Council. The 
parliamentary committee voted to retain the ‘status quo’, that is the preservation of 
votes for all NCB governors, with an enlarged Executive Board of nine members, thus 
challenging the validity of claims of a size-efficiency trade-off. However, if rotation 
was to be adopted, the parliamentary committee accepted the use of a composite 
indicator, based on the criteria of economy and financial market size but also 
population, thus challenging the legitimacy of the ECB’s more restricted criteria 
(European Parliament 2004). 
On efficiency grounds, the proposed reform does not address the concerns that 
the ECB Governing Council is already too big: the Governing Council is set to grow 
to 21 members from the present 18. Preventing some NCB governors from voting is 
not the same as preventing them from speaking and they will continue to attend all 
Governing Council meetings. Thus the potential for cacophony, that concerns Buiter 
(1999) and others remains. The nod in favour of efficiency was managed only in the 
context of a great distortion of the principle ‘one member, one vote’ with the new 
rotation system reflecting national economic size. The reform – in order to ensure 
representativeness – moves in the opposite direction to the preference of those 
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observers who advocate a more centre-heavy US Federal Reserve model (de Haan et 
al. 2005; Eijffinger 2006; Favero et al. 2000) or the Monetary Board proposed by 
Baldwin et al. (2001). The reform places increased emphasis on representation of the 
Euro-zone economy rather than member states but all NCB governors can continue to 
attend Governing Council meetings and there is an increased number of voting 
members.  
The new form of representativeness reflected in the rotation system and the 
failure to meet efficiency objectives reflects the macroeconomic preferences of the 
five Euro-zone member states with the biggest economies more than the other current 
and future member states. The establishment of two / three groups for rotation, with 
the NCB governors from the five member states with the biggest economies assured 
more frequent voting rights than the other governors seems to contradict the ad 
personam status of the NCB governors. The reform officially recognises that the 
status of the NCB governors should vary and this in turn suggests that the governors 
are not to be treated as truly independent people operating in a personal capacity. The 
reform demonstrates that the governors’ home member state is of relevance and 
determines their status, at least by guaranteeing governors from member states with 
larger economies a more frequent vote than governors from member states with 
smaller economies.  
Of course, one might see the proposed reform as ‘politically reasonable’ and 
legitimate in that it appears that the governors have recognised that economy and 
financial market size do in fact matter:  if there must be rotation why should the 
governors of the banks of Malta and Slovenia be treated the same as the Bundesbank 
President? Clearly, the member states with the biggest economies have already lost 
out in terms of a ‘representativeness’ that reflects economic size. Officially, their 
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central bank governors possess the same vote as the others on all decisions except 
those having to do with the capital of the ECB. The adoption of the new rotational 
scheme is a way of potentially strengthening this kind of ‘representativeness’, if only 
to a limited degree. Put another way, the ‘representativeness’ of one governor one 
vote has been qualified by a ‘politically reasonable’ ‘representativeness’ that accepts 
the relevance of economy size. This qualification reflects the reality that most Euro-
zone citizens are preoccupied, first and foremost, with conditions in their national 
economy rather than the Euro-zone economy as a whole. While this qualification no 
doubt reflects the power concerns of NCB governors from the largest member states, 
it might also reflect a concern with regard to public perception in these member states 
of the legitimacy of Euro-zone monetary policy making. 
Crucially, the two / three rotating group system and the agreed cap of 21 for 
Governing Council voting members reflects the macroeconomic preferences of the 
largest member states (especially Germany and France). The voice of the five largest 
member states is hardly diminished by the proposed reform, dropping from five out of 
eighteen to four out of twenty-one (in a Euro-zone of 22 member states or more). It 
might also be argued that de facto over-representation of the large member states in 
the Governing Council is set to continue. Howarth and Loedel (2005) show that the 
underlying objective of equal national representation was undermined with the first 
appointment of the Executive Board in 1998 and the (almost) constant representation 
of the four largest member states on the Executive Board.14 These Executive Board 
members are expected to maintain a focus on the entire Euro-zone, as required by the 
Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB. Nonetheless, the overrepresentation of large 
member states does challenge the principles of equality and representativeness. At the 
very least, it can be argued that having served most, if not all, of their career in their 
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member states of origin, the Executive Board members are more familiar with their 
home economy than other national economies. As explained below, this familiarity 
can have an impact on monetary policy making preferences. If Executive Board 
members are to be considered potential national representatives in disguise, the 
twenty-one maximum membership of the Governing Council established in 2003 only 
slightly diminishes the weight of the largest five member states from currently nine 
out of eighteen to eight out of twenty-one. It is very likely (interviews, ECB 2004) 
that the French and German NCB governors (and perhaps even the Italian and 
Spanish ones) preferred a double majority system of GDP size and voting members – 
or a voting system weighted according to GDP – which would have given two or 
three of these governors an effective veto on all monetary policy making. Clearly, 
such a system would have been unacceptable to the large majority of NCB governors. 
It would also have posed considerable risks for the public’s perception of the 
legitimacy of Euro-zone monetary policy making – especially, in the event of a future 
move to greater transparency in the Governing Council.15 
 
The economic danger of ‘equality’ 
In the context of enlargement, one principal consideration linked to the different 
economies and economic needs of the future Euro-zone member states likely 
contributed to the reform preferences of the largest member state NCB governors 
(interviews, ECB 2004). Given the more rapid expansion of their economies over the 
medium to long term, the future member states would have much higher inflation on 
average than existing member states and considerably higher inflation than France 
and Germany (and even Italy and Spain). Completely equal member state NCB 
governor representation on the Governing Council in an enlarged Euro-zone would 
 20 
result in the over-representation of inflation-prone member states and the possible 
establishment of an entrenched bias in favour of higher interest rates. This over-
representation arguably already exists in the current Governing Council, where 
inflation differentials between the member states have spilled over to private and 
public differences between ECB Governing Council members on interest rate 
changes, and vociferous criticism by certain Executive Board members of certain 
member states with higher inflation (Howarth and Loedel 2005). 
The fear of over-representation is linked to two related concerns. The first is 
the extent to which national policy preferences shape the governors’ (and even the 
Executive Board members’) positions. The second is the structural differences of the 
national economies. Regarding the first concern – as already noted – no explicit 
provision in the TEC and the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB prevents a NCB 
governor from presenting policy positions based on domestic data and national needs 
(de Grauwe et al. 1999; Meade and Sheets 2002). There have been a small number of 
studies which attempt to differentiate between policy making on the basis of national 
preferences and policy making on the basis Euro-zone-wide preferences and the low 
inflation target of the ECB (e.g. de Grauwe et al. 1999; Heinemann and Huefner 
2004; Sanchez-Santos and Varela 2003). The jury is out on whether or not national 
preferences have had a ‘distorting’ effect on ECB monetary policy making and this 
chapter does not attempt to enter into this debate. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the presence of a much larger number of NCB governors from small 
and medium sized national economies with relatively high inflation creates additional 
pressure for a monetary policy which focuses less on the interests of the biggest 
member state economies (Heinemann and Huefner 2004).16 
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The likelihood of a considerable inflation differential in the future enlarged 
Euro-zone is due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect:  inflation rates in the poorer ten 
CEECs will be systematically higher than in wealthier current member states and will 
likely remain so for some time (Baldwin 2001b; Bjorksten, 2000; Égert et al. 2003; 
Égert 2005; Eichengreen & Ghironi 2001). In 2004, for example, there was an 
inflation rate of 3.7 per cent for the ten future member states and 4.4 per cent for the 
twelve (the ten, Romania and Bulgaria) versus an average of two per cent for the 
current Euro-zone (ECB 2005). If we are to assume that all NCB governors view 
inflation risks similarly – despite the ECB’s overall inflation target of or close to two 
per cent over the medium term – those governors from the future member states 
would tend to prefer tighter monetary policy while those from many of old member 
states would prefer a looser policy. Baldwin et al. (2001b) thus complain of a strong 
potential for a disjuncture between the requirements of the economy of the entire 
Euro-zone (more than 70 per cent of which is made up of the five largest member 
states) and the preferences of the smallest 14 (16) member states which will form a 
majority of members in the Governing Council of an enlarged Euro-zone of 22 (24) 
member states. The economic situation of the 10 (12) accession countries thus creates 
difficulties for the entire Euro-zone and problems for monetary policy making. 
Without the 2003 reform to Governing Council voting procedures, member states 
with only six per cent of the Euro-zone GDP (2000 figures) (but 35 per cent of the 
population) would have controlled 10 voting positions on the Governing Council. In 
the future enlarged Euro-zone of 24 member states, Germany, France and Italy would 
comprise 67 per cent of the GDP yet – according to the old voting system – would 
have held only three of the NCB governors’ 24 votes or 12.5 per cent (assuming 
Sweden, Denmark and Britain stay out but all the new accession countries, Romania 
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and Bulgaria come in). In a monetary union of 27 member states, the smallest 17 
would represent only ten per cent of the Euro-zone’s economy yet would form a 
majority of votes in the Governing Council (Berger 2002). Without reform, all 
newcomers to the Euro-zone – with the exception of the United Kingdom – will have 
greater political than economic weight.   
In addition to the concern about inflation differentials between the larger and 
future poorer member states, the largest member states also had other economic 
reasons to seek to preserve their relative voting power in the Governing Council. The 
differences in monetary transmission mechanisms due to national economic structural 
differences and different national banking systems – see Angeloni et al. (2003), Bank 
of England (1999), Corsetti & Pesenti (1999), de Grauwe (2000) and EP (2001) – can 
result in different monetary policy preferences. Interest rate changes have 
significantly different effects on the national economies of the Euro-zone (although 
understanding the precise impact is an inexact science given the complexity of 
variables in the national economies). Therefore, while NCB governors might agree on 
the need for an interest rate change, a consideration of the impact of the change on 
national economies might encourage them to push for varying levels of change. 
Several variables can be mentioned. There are different levels of consumer and public 
debt:  thus interest rate changes will have a considerably different impact on 
consumer and public spending in different member states. The maturities of debt also 
vary considerably:  for example, because firms in Italy and France have shorter-term 
loans than the firms in other Euro-zone member states, they are more affected by ECB 
interest rate changes. Furthermore, the degree to which interest rate changes are 
buffered by national banks varies (Angeloni et al., 2003). The economic structures of 
the future new member states of the Euro-zone will likely vary as much as the current 
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member states. Thus, the concern of the current large member state NCB governors 
regarding new member state voting is not only related to their economic differences 
as a group but rather the further dilution of large member state concerns regarding the 
impact of interest changes. 
 
Conclusion 
Disenfranchising a significant number of the smaller member states was thus 
considered vital to the preservation of the macroeconomic preferences of the largest 
member states but also the perception of the legitimacy of Euro-zone monetary policy 
making for the citizens of these member states. However, the only way that the NCB 
governors from the existing smaller member states would agree to this reduction of 
total votes was if rotation was to apply to all the member states and if the established 
principles of equality (‘one member, one vote’) and representativeness were respected 
officially. These treaty-based principles were distorted to become, in effect: ‘one 
member, one vote only some of the time with varying frequency determined by 
economy and financial market size’.17 For the full Euro-zone of 27 members 
including all current EU member states, Romania and Bulgaria, the total number of 
votes and frequency of voting will vary considerably:  4 out of 5 and 80 per cent 
frequency for the first group; 8 out of 14 or 57 per cent for the second; and 3 out of 8 
or 37 per cent for the third. Even with fewer Euro-zone members, the preferences of 
the smallest (and crucially the future poorer) member states are much less likely to 
prevail and those of the larger member states more likely to be asserted. The 
insistence that economy and financial market size matter over population size 
(however reasonable from the perspective of monetary policy making) was also 
reflected in the preferences of the smallest of the current large member states (notably 
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the Netherlands) and other current small member states, few of which would end up 
in the third rotating group. With the possibility (however remote) of future Turkish 
entry into the Euro-zone, even German, French and Italian NCB governors had a clear 
interest in establishing group selection by economy and financial market size as 
opposed to GDP and population size. 
Given the lack of transparency surrounding the intra-ECB discussions and 
negotiations on Governing Council reform, the precise policy positions of the 
different NCB governors and the precise nature of internal debates are impossible to 
determine for the time being. However, the reform agreed upon suggests that the NCB 
governors of the largest member states defended policy positions conforming to 
national macroeconomic interests, even though compromise was necessary that took 
on board the concerns of other current Euro-zone NCB governors and respected – 
albeit only in a highly distorted manner – treaty-based principles and legitimacy 
concerns. The distortion reflects possible efforts to weaken the representation of the 
NCB governors from the future CEEC member states in order to diminish a 
structurally determined bias in favour of higher interest rates. The distortion also 
reflects the interests of the NCB governors of the largest member states to maintain 
their disproportionate representation in the Governing Council in order to ensure their 
relatively strong influence on interest rate changes affecting their economies in a 
particular way due to specific national economic structures. The reform of Governing 
Council voting procedures transforms the underlying concept of ‘representativeness’ 
in the Euro-zone. It undermines the principle of member state representation that has 
been (and remains) vital to the legitimacy of ECB policy making (and EMU more 
generally), while strengthening the relevance of national economic size and the 
representation of the entire economy of the Euro-zone (rather than its member states 
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and their populations). The official ambition to avoid enlargement contributing 
significantly to decision making inefficiency can arguably be said to have been met. 
However, inefficiency was, nonetheless, potentially worsened and the core concerns 
about size raised by many monetary economists were not addressed. 
Some monetary economists have granted qualified praise to the agreed reform 
of the ECB Governing Council and the creation of the three rotating groups. They do 
so on the grounds that this reform moves in the right direction towards a truly 
desirable voting system that aligns ‘political power and economic weight’ of national 
central bank governors as closely as possible (de Hann et al. 2005; Eijffinger 2006; 
see also Berger et al. 2004). Such a system is, according to these authors, ‘the best 
way’ – short of the centralisation of operational policy making in the Executive Board 
– ‘to ensure that national interests will not unduly influence ECB policy-making’ 
(Eijffinger 2006: 97). Their argument doubts the ad personam participation of NCB 
governors and the possibility that they can make monetary policy decisions without 
specific reference to their own national economies. If NCB governors can in effect 
represent national economic concerns over those of the Euro-zone as a whole, the 
alignment of voting power in the Governing Council with economic weight negates 
the possibility of reflecting this bias in ECB monetary policy. These observers are 
concerned with the policy making inefficiencies created by emphasising NCB 
governor equality and member state representativeness. They also believe that treating 
NCB governors equally in terms of voting rights in the Governing Council results in 
the over-representation of the smaller national economies of the Euro-zone which in 
turn damages effective ECB monetary policy. The problem will worsen with 
enlargement.  
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The analysis adopted in this paper accepts that these considerations might well 
have influenced the reform agreed by the Governing Council members. However, it is 
argued here that the move in the direction of aligning political (voting) weight and 
economic weight runs contrary to the ‘equality' and ‘representativeness’ principles in 
a manner which undermines ECB and EMU legitimacy. The argument that political 
weight should reflect economic weight responds to the legitimacy and power concerns 
of the governments of the largest Euro-zone national economies. However, the way in 
which this argument denies the equality and ad personam participation of NCB 
governors – by emphasising that they represent member state economies – 
undermines the legitimacy of the ECB and in turn the EMU project. Rooted in a 
contested EU political system, ECB and EMU legitimacy relies to an unclear extent 
on equal member state representation, however indirect and qualified by the principle 
of ad personam participation. The agreed Governing Council reform of December 
2002 and February 2003 fudges the principles of equality, representativeness and ad 
personam participation of the Governing Council members. Yet the reform does not 
entirely discard these principles. The reform is potentially damaging to ECB and 
EMU legitimacy but it is considerably less so than the reform proposals driven solely 
by either efficiency concerns or the recognition of member state economic weight or 
both. The monetary economists who advocate such proposals would do well to 
consider ‘input’ as well as ‘output’ legitimacy. 
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1 This ECB recommendation, under Article 10.6 of the Statute of the European 
System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank, for a Council Decision 
on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the European System of Central 
Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB/2003/1; 2003/C29/07) was submitted 
by the European Central Bank to the Council on 3 February 2003. The decision of the 
Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or Government, was taken 
on 21 March 2003 (Council 2003/223/EC) after taking into consideration the opinions 
of the European Commission and the European Parliament. The agreed amendment 
was then recommended to the member states for ratification in accordance with their 
respective constitutional requirements. 
2 Article 108 TEC and Article 7 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB establish 
the independence of Governing Council members. They cannot ‘seek or take 
instructions from Community institutions or bodies, from any government of a 
member state or from any other body’. 
3 All Governing Council members are independent from both national and other EU 
bodies and cannot take instruction from these bodies (Article 7 of the Statute of the 
ESCB and of the ECB).  They are also officially committed official to Euro-zone 
goals (Article 2 of the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB) which suggests that these 
goals over-ride specifically national concerns. However, it should be noted that no 
TEC or Statute provisions explicitly prevent a NCB Governor from representing 
specifically national concerns. 
4 The ‘one member, one vote’ principle is established in Article 10.2 of the Protocol 
to the TEC on the Statute of the ESCB and ECB: ‘… each member of the Governing 
Council shall have one vote’ except on a limited range of matters concerning the 
capital of the ECB where votes are weighted according to the national central banks’ 
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shares in the subscribed capital of the ECB (Art. 10.3) and the terms and conditions of 
employment of the members of the Executive Board (on which Executive Board 
members have no right to vote (Art. 11.3)).  
5 The principle of ‘representativeness’ can be said to be established in TEC Article 
III-382 and Article 10.1 of the Protocol to the TEC on the Statute of the ESCB and 
ECB which confirm that ‘the Governing Council of the European Central Bank shall 
comprise … the Governors of the national central banks of the Member States’. This 
provision is further reinforced by the equality provision of Article 10.2 of the Protocol 
to establish ‘representativeness’. 
6 Buiter (1999) for example recommends — even without Euro-zone enlargement — 
restricting the size of the Governing Council to nine members and the Executive 
Board to four. 
7 The ECB enjoys a special status and is not a Community institution in the legal 
sense. 
8 The Nice Treaty (Article 4(2)) requires the Council to adopt a rotation of European 
Commission places totalling below the number of member states once this number 
exceeds 27. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (Article I-26(6)) 
specifies this further, allowing – after one full Commission term under existing rules – 
for the number of Commissioners to equal two-thirds the number of member states 
(subject to possible modification by the European Council acting unanimously). 
9 In terms of the ECB’s operational goals, the Euro-zone wide inflation target should 
effectively force individual governors to disguise specifically national concerns. 
Furthermore, to adopt an explicitly national perspective in the Governing Council 
would discredit a NCB governor as an ‘objective’ analyst of Euro-zone wide inflation. 
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10 The fifth principle was transparency (of the wording of the text outlining the 
rotation system).  ECB Press Statement, 20 December 2002. 
11 See the section below on ‘The economic dangers of equal representation’. 
12 The other eleven Federal Reserve District Banks presidents rotate into four voting 
positions on the FOMC. The US Federal Reserve Act makes no reference to the 
relative weight of Federal Reserve districts, while section 2 of the Act establishes the 
criteria of convenience and ‘customary course of business’ to determine voting 
weights. 
13 In addition to the points made in the text, Gros challenges the lack of clarity and the 
arbitrariness surrounding the rotation of NCB governors with voting rights. He 
provides an alternative for the reform of the ECB developed by the CEPS 
Macroeconomic Policy Group — which involves the Governing Council meeting less 
often and setting the guidelines for monetary policy, while the Executive Board 
assumes more control over the execution of monetary policy — and urges the 
European Commission to propose an alternative reform for adoption by the Council. 
14 Three replacements since June 2004 demonstrate the continuity of large member 
state representation: the Spanish Executive Board member, Eugenio Domingo Solans, 
was replaced by another Spaniard, Jose Manuel Gonzalez-Paramo; the Italian 
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa by Lorenzo Bini Smaghi; and the German Ottmar Issing 
by Jürgen Stark. France was not represented on the Executive Board for only a brief 
period following the replacement of Christian Noyer as ECB Vice President and the 
accession of Jean-Claude Trichet as president.  However, this was an inevitable 
interruption given that Noyer’s departure was part of the controversial compromise 
allowing Trichet to take office. The extent to which the French President went in 1998 
to ensure the appointment of the Bank of France Governor, Trichet, as the ECB 
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president, further suggests the importance attached to securing Executive Board 
places by the largest member states. 
15 There is disagreement among legal scholars whether primary Community law 
prohibits the publication of minutes of the meetings of the Governing Council. It has 
been argued by some that Article 10.4 of Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB limits 
transparency in this regard (Amtenbrink 1999). Article 10.4 states: ‘The proceedings 
of the meetings shall be confidential.  The Governing Council may decide to make the 
outcome of its deliberations public.’ Although no provision in the TEC (and 
specifically Article VII or the Protocol on the Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB) 
necessarily blocks transparency, the ECB Governing Council members justified their 
1998 decision to prevent disclosure of Governing Council minutes as a necessary evil 
to prevent the exertion of domestic political pressures on national central bankers 
(ECB 1999). In effect, non-transparency might also the decrease the appearance of 
NCB governors advocating monetary policy changes that conform to national 
preferences (Howarth and Loedel 2005). 
16 Heinemann and Huefner (2004) apply different economic approaches to determine 
if national preferences rather than a Euro-zone focus determine ECB interest rate 
decisions. Using the ordered probit approach, these authors conclude that national 
preferences (based on controlling national inflation rates rather than the Euro-zone 
inflation rate) do affect monetary policy – although they accept clear limitations to 
their study. Given the increased divergence in the economies, and inflation rates, 
among member states in a future enlarged Euro-zone. These authors argue that …  
If for EMU-12 there is some evidence that divergence is not irrelevant 
in the Governing Council this should be even more pronounced for 
EMU-27. In this sense our first results back the case for adjusting the 
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representation and/or voting weights in the Governing Council in 
favour of the countries with large GDP shares as recommended by the 
ECB (556). 
17 Author’s own words. 
